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I. INTRODUCTION
EXAS courts continue to refine professional negligence law. This
Survey period was particularly marked by several Texas Supreme
Court opinions regarding medical malpractice issues, including a
determination of when a suit involves a "health care liability claim" and
when a plaintiff is ultimately time barred from ever bringing a claim. The
supreme court also issued an interesting opinion regarding auditors' lia-
bility for negligent misrepresentation. The high court remained relatively
silent with respect to legal malpractice, but Texas courts of appeals made
strides in that area, honing the defined scope of the attorney-client rela-
tionship and rejecting attempts to sue lawyers under theories other than
professional negligence. Texas courts also addressed several issues con-
cerning director and officer liability including jurisdiction, liability after a
corporation's privileges are forfeited, and piercing the corporate veil.
II. LEGAL MALPRACTICE
A. PROOF OF ATTORNEY NEGLIGENCE REQUIRED
The El Paso Court of Appeals affirmed judgment against the plaintiff
and in favor of the attorney defendants in Cunningham v. Hughes &
Luce, L.L.P.1 In the underlying suit, which formed the basis for the mal-
practice action, plaintiff Cunningham sued Classic BMW over a dispute
regarding repairs to her 2000 Mazda Prot6g6.2 The jury in the underlying
case awarded Cunningham $1,588,744, and she later settled with Classic
BMW for $1.2 million. 3 After the settlement, Cunningham sued the law-
yers who represented her in the case against Classic BMW. She claimed
among other things, that because of their negligence her attorneys' fees
expert was not permitted to testify in the underlying trial, thus depriving
her of an additional $300,000 to $500,000 in damages. 4 The trial judge in
the underlying case did not allow the attorneys' fees expert to testify be-
cause he believed Cunningham's discovery responses had not adequately
"disclose[d] [the expert's] opinions, the sources he relied upon, and the
amount of fees sought."'5 "During the malpractice lawsuit . . . Judge
Stokes (presiding), granted a partial summary judgment, holding that [the
judge in the underlying trial] did not abuse his discretion by excluding
[the expert's] testimony."' 6 The jury rejected all of Cunningham's claims
against the attorney defendants, the trial court entered a take nothing
judgment, and Cunningham appealed.7
1. 312 S.W.3d 62, 65 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2010, no pet.).
2. Id.




7. ld. at 66-67.
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On appeal, Cunningham claimed that because Judge Stokes ruled that
the trial judge in the underlying case had not abused his discretion in
excluding the attorneys' fees evidence, the jury was not free to "ignore or
overrule either judge" by concluding that the lawyers were not negligent.8
But the El Paso Court of Appeals disagreed, concluding that whether the
trial judge properly excluded the attorneys' fees evidence and whether
the attorneys' negligence, if any, caused that result, are not the same
question.9 The court also noted that Cunningham's malpractice counsel
opened the door to this issue by asking the attorneys' expert witness
questions (in violation of the order in limine) about the propriety of the
judges' rulings, which allowed the expert to come back on re-direct and
testify that he believed the trial judge "improperly refused" to allow the
attorneys' fees evidence.10 Based on this evidence, the jury was entitled
to find that the attorneys were not negligent in connection with the exclu-
sion of the attorneys' fees evidence."1
As we have seen in past surveys, this case is significant as another ex-
ample of Texas courts requiring proof of both negligence and causation in
order for a litigant to prevail in a legal malpractice case. Plaintiffs should
not rely on what they perceive to be a bad result without adequate proof
that such result was actually caused by some negligence by the attorney.
B. THE DALLAS COURT REJECTS ATTEMPT AT FRACTURING
The Dallas Court of Appeals refused to allow plaintiffs to fracture their
malpractice claim into multiple causes of action in Pak v. Harris.1 2 As we
have discussed in previous surveys, the "anti-fracturing rule prevents
plaintiffs from converting what are actually professional negligence
claims against an attorney into other claims such as fraud, breach of con-
tract, breach of fiduciary duty, or violations of the DTPA.'
13
The attorney in this case represented six individuals in forming several
related business organizations. 14 Shortly after the entities were formed,
three of the clients voted to exclude two of the others from employment
by and management of one of the entities.' 5 The two excluded investors
sued the attorney, Harris, claiming that he "represented them with di-
vided loyalties contrary to his oral promise to treat each person 'equally
and fairly' and failed to inform them of the conflict of interest between




10. Id. at 69-70.
11. Id. "Cunningham also failed to prove that she would have received a bigger settle-
ment from Classic had she been awarded attorneys' fees in the underlying case." Id.
12. 313 S.W.3d 454, 456 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, pet. denied).
13. Id. at 457 (citing Beck v. Law Offices of Edwin J. (Ted) Terry, Jr. P.C., 284 S.W.3d
416, 426-27 (Tex. App.-Austin 2009, no pet.)).
14. Id. at 456.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 457.
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In particular, the plaintiffs alleged that Harris failed to inform them of
discussions with some of the investors, who had asked Harris not to share
those discussions with the other investors.17 The appellate court con-
cluded that the plaintiffs had improperly fractured their claims because
the "allegations involve the question of whether Harris failed to exercise
the degree of care, skill, or diligence in performing his duty to inform
appellants about issues that could arise during the representation of mul-
tiple clients and his duty to communicate with and among the clients he
represented in this matter," which constitutes, if anything, a claim for le-
gal malpractice. 18 Plaintiffs' allegation that Harris had failed to disclose a
conflict of interest was not sufficient to maintain a separate claim for
breach of fiduciary duty.19 There was no claim that Harris received "im-
proper benefit" from the representation. 20 Therefore, because the allega-
tions involved the quality of the representation rather than questions
regarding "the integrity and fidelity of the attorney," there could be no
claim for breach of fiduciary duty or fraud.2 1
This is an important case for attorneys defending against multiple
claims arising out of a legal representation. In reaction to recent cases,
plaintiffs' counsel have become better at trying to articulate independent
causes of action for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, but this case is
helpful for defendants because it focuses on the inherent difference be-
tween a malpractice claim and a breach of fiduciary duty claim, despite
the plaintiff's use of buzz words such as "conflict of interest.
122
C. CLAIMS By NON-CLIENTS-PART ONE
The Houston Fourteenth Court of Appeals wrestled with potential
claims by non-clients in Valls v. Johanson & Fairless, L.L.P.23 In that
case, Michael Valls sued two parties for breach of a settlement agreement
and also sued his opponents' attorneys, who had drafted the agreement.24
The trial court granted summary judgment as to all defendants.2 5 The
court of appeals reversed the summary judgment as to the two parties,
but affirmed as to the lawyer defendants.2 6
On appeal, the court rejected Valls's claims for legal malpractice and
breach of fiduciary duty on the grounds that there was no attorney-client
relationship between Valls and the lawyer defendants. 27 The court noted
that both claims required proof that "the defendant in fact owed some
legal duty to the plaintiff arising from the relationship between the par-




21. Id. at 457.
22. Id.
23. 314 S.W.3d 624, 633 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.).
24. Id. at 627.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 634.
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ties."'2 8 Valls argued that he became the lawyers' de facto client by sign-
ing a settlement agreement prepared by the lawyers. 29 The court of
appeals disagreed.30 Generally, in order for an attorney-client relation-
ship to exist, both parties have to expressly agree on the services to be
performed and the fees to be paid. 31 Even in the case of an implied
agreement, the evidence must demonstrate that both parties intended to
form an attorney-client relationship.32 An attorney-client relationship
cannot be created simply by the mistaken belief of the purported client. 33
Because Valls was represented by his own attorney at all times and the
defendants were clearly representing the adverse party in the settlement,
there was no evidence to support Valls's claim that the lawyer defendants
were representing him.34
Valls also brought a claim for negligent misrepresentation, which does
not require the existence of an attorney-client relationship. 35 The lawyer
defendants did not dispute the fact that the settlement agreement con-
tained a misrepresentation regarding how the settlement proceeds would
be distributed.36 They argued, however, that Valls could not have justifia-
bly relied on the misrepresentation. 37 The court of appeals agreed, not-
ing that "a party may not justifiably rely on an opposing attorney's
statements made in an adversarial setting, such as litigation. '38 This rule
holds true for statements made by opposing counsel in settlement negoti-
ations.39 Because the negotiations at issue "involved an arms-length
transaction in which both sides were represented and advised by their
own counsel," there could be no justifiable reliance and summary judg-
ment on the negligent misrepresentation claim was proper.40
These types of claims by non-clients are a very dangerous area for prac-
ticing attorneys. In zealously representing his or her own client, an attor-
ney is almost necessarily going to be acting contrary to the interests of the
other party to a transaction or litigation. To allow suits against the attor-
ney by these non-parties would place the attorney in an almost untenable
position. Fortunately, Texas courts, like the court in Valls, have been
fairly consistent in rejecting these non-client claims.
28. Id. at 633.
29. Id.
30. See id.
31. Id. at 633-34.
32. Id. at 634.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 634-35.








A. CLAIMS BY NON-CLIENTS-PART Two
The Texas Supreme Court reaffirmed limits on negligent misrepresen-
tation claims against auditors and limited the scope of potential "holder
claims" in Grant Thornton L.L.P. v. Prospect High Income Fund.4' The
plaintiffs in that case sued the public accounting firm of Grant Thornton
L.L.P. related to its audit of the financial statements of Epic Resorts,
L.L.C.42 Plaintiffs were bond and hedge funds (the "Funds") who had
either purchased Epic bonds and/or chosen not to sell Epic bonds alleg-
edly in reliance on reports and statements by Epic's auditor, Grant
Thornton.43 The trial court in Dallas granted summary judgment for
Grant Thornton on all claims, the Dallas Court of Appeals reversed in
part, and Grant Thornton appealed to the Texas Supreme Court.44
The first issue addressed by the supreme court was a professional's
scope of liability for negligent misrepresentations to non-clients. 45 The
court reviewed the history of these non-client claims and the current
landscape in other jurisdictions, noting that the cases "fall along a spec-
trum," with some courts requiring actual privity or "near privity" to as-
sert a claim 46 and others allowing claims where a non-client's reliance is
merely foreseeable. 47 It also noted that most states have adopted the
"middle-ground" approach provided in section 552 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, which allows claims by a "'known party' [which] is one
who falls in a limited class of potential claimants, 'for whose benefit and
guidance [one] intends to supply the information or knows that the recipi-
ent intends to supply it."'48 Under this limitation, a professional provid-
ing information for use by third parties is only liable when he is "aware of
the nonclient and intends that the nonclient rely on the information. '49
The supreme court reaffirmed that this standard, as expressed in the legal
misrepresentation claim of McCamish, Martin, Brown & Loeffler v. F.E.
Appling Interests,50 remains the law in Texas.
In Grant Thornton, summary judgment was appropriate on Cayman's
negligent misrepresentation claims because one of the plaintiffs, Cayman,
was not within a limited group to whom Grant Thornton knew its state-
ments would be provided.51 The supreme court rejected Cayman's claim
that it fell within a "limited class of potential claimants" simply because it
41. 314 S.W.3d 913, 914 (Tex. 2010).
42. Id. at 915.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 198.
46. Id. (citing Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931) and
Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 483 N.E.2d 110 (N.Y. 1985)).
47. Id. (citing H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983)).
48. Id. at 919-20.
49. Id. at 920.
50. 991 S.W.2d 787, 791 (Tex. 1999).
51. Grant Thornton, 314 S.W.3d at 922.
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was one of very few potential investors for this type of bond, concluding
that Cayman's argument would extend the scope of liability from the Re-
statement approach to a foreseeability approach, which the supreme
court has "refused to embrace." 52
Related to the plaintiffs' fraud claim, the supreme court confirmed that
the intent standard for fraud is the professional's "reason-to-expect" that
her representations will affect other parties' conduct, which "requires
more than mere foreseeability; the claimant's reliance must be 'especially
likely' and justifiable, and the transaction sued upon must be the type the
defendant contemplated. '53 Prospective bond purchasers, like Cayman,
did not meet this standard.54
The supreme court also considered the reliance requirements for both
fraud and negligent misrepresentation. It held that the Funds could not
have justifiably relied on Grant Thornton's audit reports after they had
knowledge of certain "red flags" concerning Epic's funding.5 5 "[A] per-
son may not justifiably rely on a representation if there are 'red flags'
indicating such reliance is unwarranted. '56 The Funds also could not rely
on Grant Thornton's "negative assurance statement" because they had
never received or reviewed the statement.5 7 The supreme court rejected
the Funds' attempt to rely on the imputed reliance of U.S. Trust, their
escrow agent and trustee, agreeing with Grant Thornton that Texas courts
have not recognized such a "vicarious reliance" theory and, even if such a
theory were recognized, the Funds also would have to accept imputation
of U.S. Trust's knowledge of certain escrow account irregularities, which
would defeat reliance.5 8 The supreme court held that the Funds could
not rely on its agent's reliance as its own while simultaneously asserting
that it is not bound by its agent's knowledge. 59
Finally, in an issue of first impression, the supreme court considered
the Funds' "holder claims," in which they alleged that they held some of
Epic's bonds (rather than bought or sold them) in reliance on Grant
Thornton's alleged misrepresentations. 60 Courts have reached differing
conclusions on the question of whether a fraud claim can be based on the
alleged victim refraining from taking some action, such as the buying or
selling of investments. The United States Supreme Court has specifically
rejected holder claims arising under federal securities laws. 61 The Texas
52. Id. at 921 (citing Scottish Heritable Trust, PLC v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 81
F.3d 606, 613 (5th Cir. 1996)).
53. Id. at 922 (citing Ernst & Young, L.L.P. v. Pac. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 51 S.W.3d
573, 580 (Tex. 2001)).
54. See id.
55. Id. at 923-24.
56. Id. at 923 (citing Lewis v. Bank of Am. N.A., 343 F.3d 540, 546 (5th Cir. 2003)).
57. Id. at 924.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 925.
60. Id. at 924.




Supreme Court did not reach the question of whether viable holder
claims could ever be asserted under Texas law, because it ruled that any
such claims would have to require specific and direct communications be-
tween the plaintiff and defendant, which were not present in this case. 62
The court held that communications made in publicly available docu-
ments, such as audit reports and financial statements, cannot give rise to
holder claims as a matter of law.63
This case is significant for two reasons, both of which are beneficial to
defendant professionals. First, the supreme court limited the universe of
potential non-client plaintiffs who can bring a professional liability claim
and refused to extend that universe beyond that contemplated by section
552 of the Restatement. Second, although the supreme court did not
reach the important question of whether "holder claims" are recognized
at all under Texas law, it did articulate much needed guidelines regarding
who, if anyone, could bring such a claim. Taken together, these rulings
should provide additional protections to accounting and other
professionals.
IV. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
A. STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS AND REPOSE
The Texas Supreme Court decided Methodist Healthcare System of San
Antonio, Ltd. v. Rankin64 and Walters v. Cleveland Regional Medical
Center65 on the same day. Both cases presented issues concerning time
limits to bring medical malpractice claims. In these companion cases, the
supreme court determined that a plaintiff is always barred by the statute
of repose from bringing a claim more than ten years after the alleged
negligence occurs, but the same statute of repose may save claims
brought after the two year statute of limitations has run.66
In Rankin, physicians discovered that a surgical sponge had been left
inside of Emmalene Rankin during a November 1995 hysterectomy. 67
Rankin quickly filed a lawsuit against the hospital and doctors a few
months after the sponge's discovery in October 2006.68 In their motions
for summary judgment, the defendants argued that the ten-year statute of
repose for healthcare-liability claims barred plaintiff's suit.69 The trial
62. Id. at 930. The court referred a Houston Fourteenth Court of Appeals case in
which plaintiffs received numerous in-person and telephone assurances that the company
was doing well and that they should not sell their stock. Id. at 929.
63. Id. at 930-31.
64. 307 S.W.3d 283, 284 (Tex. 2010).
65. 307 S.W.3d 292, 293 (Tex. 2010).
66. Rankin, 307 S.W.3d at 284; Walters, 307 S.W.3d at 293.
67. Rankin, 307 S.W.3d at 285.
68. Id.
69. Id. The applicable statute of repose is found in TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 74.251(b) (West 2011) and states: "A claimant must bring a health care liability
claim not later than 10 years after the date of the act or omission that gives rise to the
claim. This subsection is intended as a statute of repose so that all claims must be brought
within 10 years or they are time barred."
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court granted the motion for summary judgment. 70 The court of appeals
reversed, holding that the statute of repose was unconstitutional under
the Open Courts provision of the Texas Constitution because it curtailed
Rankin's right to sue "before she had an opportunity to discover the
wrong and bring suit."' 71 The Open Courts provision states: "All courts
shall be open, and every person for an injury done him, in his lands,
goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law."'72
The supreme court reversed the appellate court, rendering judgment
for the defendant, explaining that there is no discovery rule or other ex-
ception to the statute of repose. 73 Rather, the statute of repose is an
absolute bar to suits brought more than ten years after the alleged negli-
gence, even when the claim could not have been discovered within ten
years.74 This rule holds true even for "sponge cases" although the su-
preme court acknowledged that such injuries are inherently difficult to
discover.75 "A statute of repose, by design, creates a right to repose pre-
cisely where the applicable statute of limitations would be tolled or de-
ferred. More to the point, a statute of repose serves no purpose unless it
has this effect."'76 A statute of repose serves an important function that
outweighs the plaintiff's constitutional right to an open court: it benefits
the general welfare by providing some end to otherwise "indeterminate"
potential liabilities. 77 Accordingly, Rankin's claims were time barred.78
Walters posed a similar but distinguishable situation. In that case, doc-
tors discovered a surgical sponge left over from a tubal ligation per-
formed in December 1995 on Tangie Walters. 79 During the nine and a
half years the sponge was in her, Walters experienced intermittent severe
abdominal pain, but no doctor or other health care provider blamed the
abandoned sponge.80 Soon after a doctor finally discovered the sponge,
Walters filed suit in August 2005 against her tubal ligation doctors and the
hospital where the surgery was performed. 81 The defendants each moved
for summary judgment, claiming that Walter's lawsuit was barred by the
two-year statute of limitations.8 2 Walters argued that the statute of limi-
tations violated the Open Courts provision of the Texas Constitution.
The trial court granted summary judgment, which was affirmed by the
70. Rankin, 307 S.W.3d at 285.
71. Rankin v. Methodist Heathcare Sys. of San Antonio, Ltd., 261 S.W.3d 93, 103 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 2008), rev'd by 307 S.W.3d 283 (Tex. 2010).
72. Tex. Const. art. I, § 13.
73. Rankin, 307 S.W.3d at 285, 290.
74. Id. at 292.
75. Id. at 288.
76. Id. at 290 (emphasis added).
77. Id. at 286-87.
78. Id.
79. Walters v. Cleveland Reg'l Med. Ctr., 307 S.W.3d 292, 294 (Tex. 2010).
80. Id. at 294-95.
81. Id. at 295.
82. Id.; see TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.251(a) (West 2011).
2011]
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court of appeals, and Walters appealed.8 3
The Texas Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that Wal-
ters had raised a fact issue as to whether she had brought her suit within a
"reasonable time.' '84 Although the two-year statute of limitations does
not expressly exempt sponge cases, which are "exceedingly difficult to
discover," the "Texas repose statute implicitly urges" their salvation.8 5 In
sum, "[t]he repose statute appears to be a legislative recognition that
while two years may be constitutionally too short for some claims, ten
years may be constitutionally enough for all claims."'8 6 And while the
Open Courts provision does not guarantee a tolling of time based on lack
of discovery, it gives litigants a "reasonable time to discover their injuries
and file suit."'8 7 Walters had raised a fact issue as to whether she had
reasonable time to discover the sponge because repeated doctors had ex-
amined her but none located or suspected a retained sponge for nine and
a half years.88
These cases are both important steps along the supreme court's journey
to strike the appropriate balance between providing patients adequate
time to assert malpractice claims on the one hand and providing health
care providers (and their insurers) some finality to potential liability on
the other. Because the negligence involved in "sponge cases" is often
very difficult to discover and may, in fact, go undiscovered for ten years
or more, these cases provide the perfect backdrop for the supreme court
to explore and determine these important issues of public policy.
B. WHAT IS A "HEATH CARE LIABILITY CLAIM"?
Chapter 74 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code has strict
rules that apply to all "health care liability claims" including that a claim-
ant must serve expert reports within 120 days of their original petition. 89
Failure to serve such a report may result in dismissal of the plaintiff's
entire case.90 For the past several years, Texas courts have faced the
question of which claims are health care liability claims and thus require
expert reports to be served within 120 days of the petition.
During this Survey period, Texas courts continued to grapple with the
parameters of a "health care liability claim." Most notably, the Texas
Supreme Court withdrew and superseded an opinion reported on in last
year's Survey, Marks v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hospital.91 In the new opin-
ion, the majority of justices agreed that Marks's claims based on the fail-
83. Walters v. Cleveland Reg'l Med. Ctr., 264 S.W.3d 154, 159 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 2007), rev'd by 307 S.W.3d 292 (Tex. 2010).
84. Walters v. Cleveland Reg'l Med. Ctr., 307 S.W.3d 292, 293 (Tex. 2010).
85. Id. at 297.
86. Id. at 298.
87. Id. at 295.
88. Id. at 294.
89. TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351(a) (West 2011).
90. Id. at § 74.351(b).
91. See Kelli M. Hinson, Jennifer Evans Morris & Jennie C. Bauman, Professional
Liability, 63 SMU L. REV. 730, 737-38 (2010) (discussing Marks v. St. Luke's Episcopal
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ure of a hospital bed rail fell within chapter 74's definition of a health
care liability claim-and not a premises liability claim-although the jus-
tices differed on where to draw the line.92
Irving Marks was a patient recovering from back surgery in the defen-
dant hospital. 93 When attempting to get out of his hospital bed, he
pushed off the bed's footboard. 94 The footboard allegedly came loose,
causing Marks to fall and become injured.95 Marks claimed the hospital
was negligent under a variety of theories including "(1) failing to train
and supervise its nursing staff properly, (2) failing to provide him with the
assistance he required for daily living activities, (3) failing to provide him
with a safe environment in which to recover, and (4) providing a hospital
bed that had been negligently assembled and maintained by the hospital's
employees. ' 96 Marks served a medical report more than 500 days after
filing his claim-well outside the 120-day deadline. Upon the Hospital's
motion, the trial court dismissed all of Marks's claims.97 Because no re-
port was timely served, the statute mandated dismissal. 98 The trial court
further declined to extend Marks's time to file an expert report.99 The
court of appeals ultimately affirmed the dismissal of all of the claims, con-
cluding that they were all heath care liability claims and a report should
have been served; Marks appealed. 100
The Texas Supreme Court agreed that the claims should be dis-
missed. 10 1 Marks argued that at least his last claim was not a health care
liability claim because the footboard posed an unsafe condition in the
nature of a premises liability claim.' 0 2 But, said the plurality, "it is the
gravamen of the claim, not the form of the pleadings, that controls"
whether the claim is a heath care liability claim.10 3 The plurality looked
to the definition of a "heath care liability claim":
[A] cause of action against a health care provider or physician for
treatment, lack of treatment, or other claimed departure from ac-
Hosp., No. 07-0783, 2009 WL 2667801 (Tex. Aug. 28, 2009), superseded by 319 S.W.3d 658
(Tex. 2010)).








100. Id. The appellate court originally reversed the dismissal, holding that Marks's
claims were not health care liability claims. The Texas Supreme Court remanded the case
in light of its opinion in Diversicare Gen. Partner, Inc. v. Rubio, 185 S.W.3d 842, 854 (Tex.
2005). On remand, the appellate court affirmed the dismissal, deciding that the claims
were in fact heath care liability claims. Id.
101. Id. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 4590i section 1.03(a)(4) applied to define "heath care
liability claim" in this case. That section has since been repealed, but, as the Court noted,
similar legislation is now codified in sections 74.301-.303 of the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code. Marks, 319 S.W.3d at 660 n.2.
102. Id. at 662.
103. Id. at 664 (citing Diversicare, 185 S.W.3d at 854).
20111
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cepted standards of medical care, or health care, or safety or profes-
sional or administrative services directly related to health care, which
proximately results in injury to or death of a claimant, whether the
claimant's claim or cause of action sounds in tort or contract. 10 4
The justices held that Marks's claim concerning the footboard fell well
within that definition. 105 "[An accepted standard of safety is implicated
under the [statute] when the unsafe condition or thing, causing injury to
the patient, is an inseparable or integral part of the patient's care or treat-
ment.' 0 6 While not every accidental injury that occurs at a health care
facility leads to a claim under the statute, the "relationship between the
injury causing event and the patient's care or treatment must be substan-
tial and direct for the cause of action to be a health care liability
claim."'01 7 The medical equipment used in a patient's care-including
footboards-is an "inseparable part" of the health care services
provided.108
Marks further argued that he should be allowed the statutorily-allowed
grace period to file an expert report because the failure to file one the
first time was an accident or mistake within the meaning of the statute. 0 9
Marks provided an affidavit from his attorney explaining that the attor-
ney was retained after the claim had been filed and "understood the case
to be an ordinary negligence case, not a health care liability claim."110
Later, the attorney determined that there was a potential health care lia-
bility claim, at which point he served a medical report, albeit more than
380 days late."' The Texas Supreme Court was not persuaded by the
affidavit, noting the lack of explanation of the first attorney to serve an
expert report and a failure to explain what triggered the second attorney
to file the late expert report.1 2 The trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion in failing to grant a grace period to file the required expert report." 3
Justice Johnson concurred because he believed that "accepted stan-
dards of . . . safety" were too narrowly construed in the plurality opin-
ion.1" 4 He believed "safety" under the statute should mean "untouched
by danger; not exposed to danger; secure from danger, harm or loss" as
the supreme court had previously written in Diversicare General Partner,
Inc. v. Rubio." 5 This definition is broader and would more fully honor
the legislative intent to broadly cover claims by patients against health
104. Id. at 662 (citing TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.001(a)(13) (West
2011)).




109. Id. at 665.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 666.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 667 (Johnson, J. concurring).
115. Id. at 672 (Johnson, J., concurring) (quoting Diversicare Gen. Partner, Inc. v. Ru-
bio, 185 S.W.3d 842, 855 (Tex. 2005)).
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care providers. 116
Chief Justice Jefferson wrote separately, in dissent, urging for consis-
tency in the law.11 7 Jefferson noted that the plurality strayed from its
decision in Diversicare, in which the supreme court stated a patient's
claim involving a staircase falling under her would give rise to a premises
claim, not a health care claim.11 8 Jefferson argued that the footboard
claims related to Marks's treatment "in the same way that the stairs,
walls, and utilities do: without access to the room, shelter from the ele-
ments, power to adjust the room's temperature and to run medical equip-
ment, doctors would be unable to deliver medical services." 11 9 He also
noted the plurality's failure to fully explain "how a piece of wood at the
end of a bed is integral to medical care."' 2 °
The determination of whether a claim constitutes a "health care liabil-
ity claim" can dramatically affect the litigation and ultimately the out-
come and potential damages in a personal injury case. This opinion is
very significant because the court attempts to further define the limits of
what types of cases are covered by chapter 74. Because of the lack of a
unified voice from the court on this issue, however, this opinion may
serve to create more uncertainty in the short term as lower courts strug-
gle to categorize the cases before them.
C. AGREEMENTS To EXTEND THE 120-DAY DEADLINE
FOR EXPERT REPORTS
The Texas Supreme Court held in Spectrum Healthcare Resources, Inc.
v. McDaniel that, while parties may agree to extend the 120-day deadline
for threshold expert reports, they must do so expressly.1 21 In that case,
Janice McDaniel filed a medical malpractice case against a medical center
and others based on injuries she received while in physical therapy.1 22
The parties entered into a docket control order that provided deadlines
for designation of expert witnesses: "Plaintiffs will designate all expert
witnesses that they intend to call at the trial of this case, live or by deposi-
tion, and shall provide written reports and curriculum vitae of all retained
experts in this case on or before January 11, 2006."123
The docket control order additionally provided that its deadlines con-
trolled to the extent they conflicted with another rule or statute.124 When
McDaniel did not serve expert reports within 120 days of filing her peti-
tion, the trial court dismissed her case.1 25 A divided court of appeals re-
116. Id. at 673 (Johnson, J., concurring).
117. Id. at 674 (Jefferson, C.J., dissenting).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 674 (Jefferson, C.J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 675 (Jefferson, C.J., dissenting).
121. 306 S.W.3d 249, 254 (Tex. 2010).
122. Id. at 250.
123. Id. at 251.
124. Id. at 252.
125. Id. at 250.
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versed, holding that the docket control order unambiguously expressed
intent to replace statutory deadlines for serving all expert reports, includ-
ing the threshold reports. 126 McDaniel appealed.
McDaniel argued to the supreme court that the docket control order
provided the deadline for providing reports from all retained experts,
which would necessarily include those retained to write the threshold ex-
pert reports. 127 She further claimed that the docket control order ex-
pressly stated that it controlled cases of conflicts with other laws. 128
Moreover, the docket control order elsewhere provided that discovery
would continue when discovery would normally be stayed under chapter
74.129 This, McDaniel reasoned, demonstrated that the docket control
order (regardless of whether it expressly mentioned chapter 74 expert re-
ports) controlled and provided the preliminary expert report deadline. 30
The supreme court disagreed, holding that an "agreed docket control
order must explicitly reference [Chapter 74] threshold expert reports if
the order is to constitute an agreement to extend that deadline.' 131
Three considerations dictated this result. First, the threshold expert re-
ports have a separate purpose wholly distinguishable from "typical" ex-
pert reports. 132 The threshold reports are intended to create a
substantive hurdle to frivolous lawsuits. Holding that the docket control
order's routine expert report deadline superseded this purpose would
contravene legislative intent. Second, not all retained experts' reports are
discoverable-if the expert is a consulting expert whose opinions are not
reviewed by a testifying expert, these reports would never be subject to
discovery. 133 But a threshold expert report is a separate category en-
tirely-it must be produced but is generally not admissible at trial.' 34 Fi-
nally, the court emphasized the "ubiquity" of agreed docket control
orders and expressed concern whether these "simple standard" orders
were sufficient to supersede the threshold expert report requirement. 135
It would be "impractical" to require courts and parties to inquire deeper
into the standard docket control order to determine if its intent was to do
away with the 120-day deadline. 136 Because, under the court's analysis,
the docket control order did not do away with the chapter 74 requirement
for a threshold report and no report was served, the supreme court re-
versed the court of appeals and affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the
126. McDaniel v. Spectrum Healthcare Res., Inc., 238 S.W.3d 788, 795 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 2007), rev'd by 306 S.W.3d 249 (Tex. 2010).
127. McDaniel, 306 S.W.3d at 252.
128. Id.
129. Id. Section 74.351(s) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code provides that
most discovery is stayed until the required expert report and CV are served. TEX. CIv.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351(s) (West 2011).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 253.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 253-54 (citing Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.7(c)-(d), 192.3(e)).






This case presents an important lesson for attorneys seeking to extend
the deadline to serve chapter 74 preliminary expert reports. Plaintiffs'
attorneys cannot rely on vague language setting the deadline for expert
reports. If the parties have truly agreed to extend the deadline for the
required chapter 74 reports, that intention needs to be explicitly spelled
out in a Rule 11 agreement. As is evidenced by the McDaniel case, a
mistake in the timing of a preliminary expert report can have disastrous
consequences.
D. DEADLINE To SERVE EXPERT REPORTS RUNS FROM THE FIRST
PETITION NAMING DEFENDANT
During the Survey period, several courts of appeals agreed that the
120-day expert report deadline begins to run when the defendant is
sued-even if they are sued months after the plaintiff's first petition.
1 38
These decisions directly conflict with the decision of the Dallas Court of
Appeals in Lone Star HMA, L.P. v. Wheeler, reported on in the last Sur-
vey. 139 In Wheeler, the court relied on the precise language of the statute
and held that the expert report deadline ran from the "original peti-
tion"-the first petition filed in the case. 140 Appellate courts during this
Survey period, however, held that the statute was meant to require an
expert report within 120 days of the first petition naming the particular
defendant at issue.
One example is Hayes v. Carroll. In that case, Janet Carroll's left leg
was amputated allegedly because of the "tourniquet-like effect" of a too-
tight bandage placed below her knee. 141 Carroll filed her original peti-
tion and expert reports on May 8, 2007. On October 30, 2007, Carroll
added physician and nurse defendants in her first amended petition. 142 In
January 2008, Carroll served the new defendants with expert reports that
discussed the new defendants' liability.1 43 The new defendants moved to
dismiss Carroll's claims, arguing that the expert reports as to them should
137. Id. Several justices wrote in agreement of the supreme court's bright-line rule but
not with its application to McDaniel: "Had she known that following the trial court's order
would lead to dismissal of her claim, she could have taken steps to preserve her rights.
Instead, having complied with the order, she now finds herself without recourse." Id. at
255 (Jefferson, C.J., dissenting). The dissenters would apply the holding prospectively
rather than retroactively have plaintiffs' claims dismissed. Id.
138. See Stroud v. Grubb, 328 S.W.3d 561, 562 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2010,
pet. denied); Hayes v. Carroll, 314 S.W.3d 494, 501 (Tex. App.-Austin 2010, pet. denied);
Padre Behavioral Health Sys., LLC v. Chaney, 310 S.W.3d 78, 84 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 2010, no pet.); Daybreak Cmty Servs., Inc. v. Cartrite, 320 S.W.3d 865, 873 (Tex.
App.-Amarillo 2010, no pet.); Kingwood Specialty Hosp., Ltd. v. Barley, 328 S.W.3d 611,
613 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.).
139. See Kelli M. Hinson, Jennifer Evans Morris & Jennie C. Bauman, Professional
Liability, 63 S.M.U. L. REV. 730, 742 (2010) (discussing Lone Star HMA, L.P. v. Wheeler,
292 S.W.3d 812 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009, no pet.)).
140. Wheeler, 292 S.W.3d at 816.
141. Hayes, 314 S.W.3d at 497-98.




have been served 120 days after May 8, 2007-when the "original peti-
tion" was filed.1 44 The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, and the
defendants appealed. 145
On appeal, Carroll argued that the deadline to file an expert report
should run from the date that particular defendant was first sued.146 The
Austin Court of Appeals agreed, holding that "[i]f the pleading is the first
pleading naming a defendant, it is the 'original' petition as to that defen-
dant regardless of its title, and the 120-day expert report deadline is trig-
gered by that filing as to that defendant. 1 47 According to the Court, This
reading is consistent with the legislative intent, which contemplates the
120 days being triggered by the filing of a lawsuit.1 48 A lawsuit is first
filed against a defendant with the petition that adds that defendant re-
gardless of whether other defendants were previously sued under the
same cause number.1 49 The court further noted "interpretational and
logical problems" if the statute was read to require an expert report
within 120 days of the original petition regardless of when the defendant
was added to the case. 150 Primarily, that reading would serve as a "de
facto statute of limitations" on the plaintiff's claim, and a plaintiff ought
to be able to bring a claim against a new defendant outside of 120 days
from first filing suit.1 51
These cases are significant in that they create a conflict between the
courts of appeals on the critical issue of the timing of preliminary expert
reports. Under the Wheeler case, a plaintiff has a 120-day window from
the filing of his first petition to sue and serve all potential defendants as
well as to serve them with expert reports. Under the Hayes case, how-
ever, a plaintiff's deadline to sue and serve potential defendants is gov-
erned only by the statute of limitations (or potentially a court's docket
control order). Given this split of authority and the outcome-determina-
tive nature of this timing question, plaintiffs would be wise to make sure
all potential defendants are served with expert reports within the initial
120 day period.
E. HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS PROTECTED IN EMERGENCY
SITUATIONs-EVEN WHEN THE EMERGENCY
Is NOT RECOGNIZED
As a part of 2003 tort reform legislation, the Legislature provided that
in a health care liability claim involving "emergency medical care," the
144. Id. at 499.
145. Id. at 497. Section 51.014(a)(9) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code
allows for interlocutory appeal of a denial of a motion to dismiss based on failure to timely
serve expert reports. TEx. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(9) (West 2008).
146. Id. at 499.
147. Id. at 501.






health care provider may be found liable only if it "with wilful and wan-
ton negligence, deviated from the degree of care and skill that is reasona-
bly expected of an ordinarily prudent physician or health care provider in
the same or similar circumstances. 1 52 In Turner v. Franklin, the Dallas
Court of Appeals became the first Texas appellate court to squarely ad-
dress this provision, and it potentially limited heath care provider liability
by including situations that actually are emergencies even if they are not
diagnosed or recognized as such. 153
The case began when a 14-year-old patient presented at a hospital in
Allen, Texas, shortly after midnight with severe pain in his lower abdomi-
nal region and a swollen left testicle.1 54 There were two possible diagno-
ses: testicular torsion or epididymitis. 155 Testicular torsion requires
immediate attention within four to six hours or the testicle will die. 156
Epidiymitis, on the other hand, is treated on a non-emergent basis with
antibiotics. 157 Defendant emergency room doctor, Jonathan Franklin,
and Defendant on-call radiologist, Dr. Evan Cohn, ultimately diagnosed
epididymitis, and the patient was discharged with an antibiotics prescrip-
tion.158 The epididymitis diagnosis was confirmed over the next few days
by the young man's pediatrician and a separate emergency room physi-
cian.159 However, six days after the original hospital presentation, a doc-
tor correctly diagnosed testicular torsion, and the then nonviable left
testicle was removed. 160
The patient's parents brought a health care liability claim against Drs.
Franklin and Cohn, claiming that the doctors had misdiagnosed the con-
dition and that they should have consulted a urologist.1 61 Both doctors
filed traditional motions for summary judgment, arguing that the willful
and wanton standard applied and their conduct did not, as a matter of
law, rise to that level.1 62 Dr. Cohn also filed a no evidence summary
judgment motion, claiming the plaintiffs could not raise a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether he had "acted with willful and wanton negli-
gence. ' 163 The trial court granted summary judgment for both doctors
and the plaintiffs appealed.' 64
The plaintiffs argued that physicians should not get the benefit of the
willful and wanton standard when they misdiagnose a problem and treat
it on a non-emergency basis. 165 The willful and wanton standard, they
152. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.153 (West 2011) (emphasis added).
153. 325 S.W.3d 771, 779 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, pet. denied).




158. Id. at 774-75.
159. Id.








argued, was designed only to apply when the "physician diagnoses a con-
dition as an emergency and treats it accordingly.' 1 66 But the court dis-
agreed.' 67 Whether a situation was an emergency did not depend on
whether the heath care provider recognized it as such. 168 The appellate
court determined that the patient in this case had received "emergency
medical care" based on the statutory definition:
[B]ona fide emergency services provided after the sudden onset of
a medical or traumatic condition manifesting itself by acute symp-
toms of sufficient severity, including severe pain, such that the ab-
sence of immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected
to result in placing the patient's health in serious jeopardy, serious
impairment to bodily functions, or serious dysfunction of any bodily
organ or part. 169
The court held that application of the willful and wanton standard set
out in chapter 74 depends on "(1) the type of care provided (i.e. 'bona
fide emergency services'), and (2) the circumstances under which those
services are provided."'170 Under the first prong, the court concluded that
"bona fide emergency services" meant to apply to both diagnosis and
treatment. 171 This is because the chapter 74 definition of "medical care"
included "any act defined as practicing medicine under § 151.002, Occu-
pations Code."'1 72 The Occupations Code, in turn, included both diagno-
sis and treatment as "practicing medicine. ' 173 Therefore, "'bona fide
emergency services' means any actions or efforts undertaken in a good
faith effort to diagnose or treat a mental or physical disease or disorder or
a physical deformity or injury by any system or method, or the attempt to
effect cures of those conditions.' 1 74 The court also reasoned that if heath
care providers benefited from the willful and wanton standard only when
they diagnosed emergencies, there would be incentive for them to always
"assume the most dire of possibilities," which was not the Legislature's
intent. 175
Under the second prong, the court held that the circumstances of care
should be determined on a prospective basis to determine whether there
was a need for immediate medical attention. 176 This view of emergency
care was compelled by the statute, which included situations where "im-
mediate medical attention could reasonably be expected" or else risk
harm to the patient. 77
166. Id. at 778-79.
167. id. at 779.
168. Id.
169. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.001(7) (West 2005) (emphasis added).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 778.
172. Id. (citing TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.001(19) (West 2005)).
173. Id. (citing TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 151.002(13) (West Supp. 2009)).
174. Id. (emphasis added).
175. Id. at 779.




Additionally, the court held that "wilful and wanton negligence" meant
the same thing as "gross negligence" and that claims subject to the willful
and wanton standard could be disposed of at the summary judgment
stage of a case. 178 In this case, the plaintiffs had not raised a genuine
issue of material fact that Dr. Cohn (who filed a no evidence motion) had
an "actual, subjective awareness of the risk involved and [chose] to pro-
ceed in conscious indifference to the rights, safety, or welfare of
others,"1179 and the court therefore affirmed summary judgment for Dr.
Cohn. 180 However, Dr. Franklin (who filed only a traditional motion)
had not proved as a matter of law that he had not acted with willful and
wanton negligence, and the summary judgment was reversed and re-
manded as to him. 181
This case is significant in that it extends the benefit of the "wilful and
wanton" standard to a whole range of situations that may not have been
considered "emergencies" at the time the health care was provided. This
higher standard can create a substantial obstacle for a plaintiff at the
summary judgment stage and at trial. The opinion also raises questions
about the proof that is necessary to raise a fact issue on the subjective
element of willful and wanton negligence, i.e., that the health care pro-
vider had "an actual, subjective awareness of the risk and chose to pro-
ceed in conscious indifference. 1 182
V. DIRECTOR AND OFFICER LIABILITY
A. PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER NON-RESIDENT DIRECTORS
Non-resident officers of foreign corporations doing business in Texas
can rest easier knowing they are not subject to personal jurisdiction in
Texas merely by their status as officers. But non-resident officers of
Texas corporations may not be so lucky. In Kelly v. General Interior Con-
struction, Inc., the Texas Supreme Court examined whether a plaintiff es-
tablished specific jurisdiction over non-resident officers of a foreign
corporation pleading a connection between the officers' alleged wrongdo-
ing and the forum state.183 After a dispute arose over a Houston hotel
renovation gone awry, the owner of the hotel sued the general contractor
and subcontractor. 184 The subcontractor then filed third-party claims
against the general contractor's two officers, both Arizona residents, for
breach of contract, violations of the Texas Trust Fund Act, 185 and
178. Id. at 780-81, 783.
179. Id. at 783 (citing Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Inc. v. Hague, 271 S.W.3d
238, 248 (Tex. 2008)).
180. Id. at 786.
181. Id. at 785.
182. Id. at 783.
183. 301 S.W.3d 653, 655 (Tex. 2010).
184. Id. at 656.
185. The Texas Trust Fund Act provides that payments to a contractor or its officers or
agents are funds held in trust by the contractor or its officers or agents for the subcontrac-
tor beneficiaries. TEX. PROP. CODE. ANN. § 162.001 et seq. (West 2011).
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fraud. 186 Both the claim under the Texas Trust Fund Act and the fraud
claim were based on the same alleged set of facts-that the officers pro-
vided an affidavit to the owner saying they had paid or would pay all
subcontractors, when in fact those statements were untrue. 187
The trial court denied the officers' special appearance, and a divided
court of appeals affirmed in part, reversing only as to the breach of con-
tract claim.188 The dissent argued that because none of the alleged acts
occurred in Texas and the subcontractor failed to allege that the officers
committed any act or conducted any business in Texas, the officers' spe-
cial appearance on all claims should have been granted. 189
The supreme court agreed, finding that the subcontractor failed to
meet its initial burden to show minimum contacts in Texas sufficient to
support specific jurisdiction. 190 It failed to plead that any tortious acts,
including making the alleged misrepresentations or executing the false
affidavits, occurred in Texas. 191 Finding that the court of appeals erred by
reasoning that the fraud sufficiently "relate[d] to" conduct purposely di-
rected to Texas, the supreme court explained that it had previously re-
jected the concept of "directed-a-tort jurisdiction" in Michiana Easy
Livin' Country, Inc. v. Holten.192 Because the subcontractor failed to
plead Texas-specific allegations, the officers negated all jurisdictional ba-
ses by proving they did not live in Texas.
The officers in TexVa, Inc. v. Boone were not so fortunate. 193 In that
case, a dispute arose between California directors and the Texas director
of a Texas corporation concerning whether the California officers had
breached an agreement or a fiduciary duty arising out of their business
relationship. 194 The trial court granted the California officers' special ap-
pearance, and the Texas officer appealed. 195
The parties initially started working together selling skin care products
through a partnership, agreeing to operate their business out of their re-
spective homes in Bakersfield, California and Plano, Texas.196 The par-
ties subsequently decided to incorporate their business as a Texas
corporation, CoreTex Products, Inc. ("CoreTex"), though it was undis-
puted that the corporation's headquarters were at all times in Bakers-
186. Kelly, 301 S.W.3d at 655-56.
187. Id. at 656.
188. Kelly v. Gen. Interior Constr., Inc., 262 S.W.3d 79, 99 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 2008), rev'd in part by 301 S.W.3d 653 (Tex. 2010).
189. Id.
190. Kelly, 301 S.W.3d at 661.
191. Id. at 659-60.
192. Id. at 661 (citing Michiana Easy Livin' Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777
(Tex. 2005) (finding phone call initiated by Texas plaintiff, in a suit alleging misrepresenta-
tions on the call, was not sufficient contacts by Indiana defendant to support specific
jurisdiction)).
193. 300 S.W.3d 879 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009, pet. denied).
194. Id. at 885.
195. Id. at 884.
196. Id. at 883-84.
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field, California. 197 Almost all of CoreTex's business was conducted out
of the Bakersfield office. 198 The Texas officer, however, continued to
maintain his home office in Piano and conducted CoreTex business
there.199 CoreTex also maintained Texas customers from the start.2°°
The California officers traveled to Texas four times-only two of which
were related to the corporation's business.20 1
Rejecting general jurisdiction, the Dallas Court of Appeals focused on
specific jurisdiction. 20 2 Most of the California officers' contacts with
Texas related to the management and control of CoreTex.20 3 The court
noted that in Rittenmeyer v. Grauer, it had previously rejected subjecting
"a non-resident director of a foreign corporation ... to personal jurisdic-
tion solely because the corporation has its headquarters in Texas. '20 4 The
court also noted that the Texas Supreme Court had not created a bright
line test whereby a non-resident officer was subject to Texas specific juris-
diction merely by being an officer of a Texas corporation. 20 5
Performing a traditional minimum contacts test by looking at whether
the officers purposefully availed themselves of Texas jurisdiction and
whether the causes of action arose out of that availment, the court fo-
cused on the California officers' choice to incorporate their business in
Texas and to serve as officers of a Texas corporation.20 6 The officers
"clearly sought to profit... through formation of a Texas corporation. '20 7
The court rejected the officers' argument that all of their contacts were in
their representative capacity, finding that this confuses the fiduciary
shield doctrine, which applies only to general jurisdiction and does not
shield an officer from his own tortious and fraudulent actions.208 Because
the underlying litigation concerned whether one of the parties had
breached an agreement or a fiduciary duty arising out of the business
relationship incorporated in Texas that the California officers agreed to,
the court found specific personal jurisdiction.20 9
Clearly, a corporate officer's ability to be sued in a Texas court can
have significant ramifications, and these cases are, therefore, very impor-
tant additions to the mix on Texas law in this area.




201. ld. at 884-85.
202. Id. at 886.
203. Id. at 884.
204. Id. at 887 (quoting Rittenmeyer v. Grauer, 104 S.W.3d 725 (Tex. App.-Dallas
2003, no pet.)).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 887-88.





B. THE TAX MAN COMETH
Pay your taxes. During the Survey period, several courts of appeals
imposed liability on directors and officers when their corporations for-
feited their right to do business in Texas by failing to pay their tax obliga-
tions or file related reports. In Taylor v. First Community Credit Union,
the Fourteenth Court of Appeals explored whether a "relation back"
doctrine applies when a director or officer is subject to liability for a cor-
poration's debts after its corporate privileges are forfeited. 210 An auto-
mobile dealership, chartered in Georgia and authorized to do business in
Texas, failed to file its required franchise report by its due date of Sep-
tember 7, 2004, and subsequently forfeited its corporate privileges and
certificate. 211 Taylor, a director of the automobile dealership, served in
that capacity from the dealership's inception through and after forfeiting
its privileges.2 12
A year prior to missing its reporting deadline, the dealership executed
a dealership agreement whereby a credit union "was granted the right to
purchase retail installment contracts from [the dealership.] '213 Pursuant
to the agreement, the credit union purchased four installment contracts in
December 2004 and January 2005.214 The dealership subsequently
breached the agreement by failing to provide good title to the purchasers
of cars under the installment contracts assigned to the credit union. 215
After the dealership failed to respond to a demand to repurchase the
installment contracts, the credit union filed suit against the dealership and
its director, claiming that he should be held personally liable under sec-
tions 171.252 and 171.255 of the Texas Tax Code.2 16
The trial court found in favor of the credit union.2 17 On appeal, Tay-
lor's only argument was that the installment contracts "related back" to
the original dealership agreement, which was executed prior to the corpo-
ration's loss of privileges. 218 Consequently, he argued he was not liable
for breaches of that agreement even though the installment contracts
were purchased after the loss of privileges.2 1 9 After distinguishing
Schwab v. Schlumberger Well Surveying Corp.,2 20 where the Texas Su-
preme Court found that renewal notes were new evidence of an existing
debt and not new debt, the court noted that it had previously recognized
210. 316 S.W.3d 863, 864 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.).





216. Id. Under sections 171.252 and 171.255, "if the corporate privileges ... are for-
feited for the failure to file a report or pay a tax or penalty, each director or officer of the
corporation is liable for each debt [... ] of the corporation that is created or incurred in
[Texas] until the privileges are revived. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.255(a) (West 2011).
217. Id. at 866.
218. Id. at 868.
219. Id. at 867.
220. 145 Tex. 379, 383-84 (1946).
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a "relation back" doctrine in River Oaks Shopping Center v. Pagan.
221
Since the Pagan decision, however, the Texas Legislature enacted a defi-
nition of debt used in section 171.255.222 Under this definition, a debt is
"a legally enforceable obligation measured in a certain amount of
money. '223 Because the measurable obligation arose out of the install-
ment contracts and those contracts were entered into after the failure to
file the report, the director was personally liable for the debts.224
In Greene v. State, the Austin Court of Appeals addressed whether
compliance with the Texas Tax Code's notice requirements under section
171.256 was a condition precedent for imposing director and officer liabil-
ity after a forfeiture. 22 5 In that case, a jewelry business entered bank-
ruptcy shortly after the Texas Comptroller notified the business that its
tax liability was approximately $1.5 million.226 The State of Texas, the
City of Dallas, and the Transit Authority of Dallas filed suit against the
jewelry company and its sole officer and director Bobby Blu Greene.227
The trial court rendered judgment against the company and found
Greene jointly and severally liable for $1.1 million.22 8
On appeal, Greene argued that "the State failed to establish that the
Comptroller had fully complied with the notice requirements of
§ 171.256," which requires the Comptroller to mail notice to a corpora-
tion at least forty-five days prior to forfeiture of the corporate privi-
leges.2 29 The court of appeals disagreed, finding "no indication in . . .
sections 171.255 or 171.256 that officer and director liability is contingent
upon pre-forfeiture notice to the corporation. '230 Instead, officers and
directors are statutorily on notice that a corporation's failure to fulfill
franchise tax requirements will result in the forfeiture of corporate privi-
leges.2 31 According to the court, there was no question that the officer
received actual notice of the forfeiture, given that the officer took the
necessary steps to revive the privileges after each forfeiture.232 Refusing
to "judicially amend [the] statute," the court held that the notice require-
ments were not conditions precedent to officer and director liability
under section 171.255.233
221. 712 S.W.2d 190, 191-92 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
222. See Act of May 30, 1987, 70th Leg., R.S., ch. 324, § 1, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 1734,
1735 (defining "debt" as used in chapter 171) (repealed effective 2008).
223. Id. at 280.
224. Id.
225. 324 S.W.3d 276, 286 (Tex. App.-Austin 2010, no pet.).
226. Id. at 279.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 280.
230. Id. at 286.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 287.
233. Id. The officer also argued that the imposition of tax liability on an officer or
director without prior notice and a hearing unconstitutionally violated due process. Id. at
288. Because officers and directors are entitled to a full and complete hearing on their tax
liability in district court (see TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.010 (West 2008)) and because
trial de novo affords "an adequate legal remedy to the taxpayer" (Greene, 324 S.W.3d at
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The Fourteenth District Court in Houston in McCarroll v. My Sentinel,
L.L.C. addressed whether a corporation incurred a debt for purposes of
section 171.255 under the Texas Tax Code at the execution of a contract
or at the rendition of a judgment. 234 Section 171.255 limits a director or
officer's liability to debts "created or incurred in this state. '235 After rev-
ocation of its charter, a Texas corporation entered into the agreement
selling security system monitoring accounts to a Utah corporation. It was
undisputed that the contract was entered into in Texas. 236 The contract
was breached, however, and the Utah corporation received a default
judgment to that effect in Utah. 237 After the Utah corporation sought to
hold the officers of the Texas corporation personally liable, the officers
argued that the event creating the debt was the Utah default judgment. 238
The court of appeals disagreed, finding that the relevant event was when
the contract in question was assented to-not breached. 239 "The issuance
of the judgment did not ... create the debt," but rather assessed liability
for failure to pay the debt.240 Since the legal right to collect on the debt
was created by the contract and the contract was entered into in Texas,
the officers and directors were properly liable for the debt under section
171.255.241
Because the failure to pay corporate taxes can subject the officers and
directors to personal liability, and because the law in this area is not well
settled and can be very fact-driven, the best course for officers and direc-
tors is to make sure the corporation stays current on its taxes rather than
trying to litigate these issues of personal liability on the back end.
C. COURTS CLARIFY VEIL-PIERCING
In a matter of first impression, the Waco Court of Appeals addressed
whether to apply Texas or foreign veil-piercing law when determining di-
rectors' and officers' liability for debts of a foreign corporation.242 In
Phillips v. United Heritage Corp., after an investment company was incor-
porated as an exempt company in the Turks and Caicos Islands (TCI), it
entered into a subscription agreement with a Utah corporation-whose
principal place of business was Johnson County, Texas-for a private of-
fering of certain of the Utah corporation's securities. 243 After a majority
of the shares were sold by the foreign investment company, the Utah cor-
288 (citing Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n v. Macha, 780 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo 1989, writ denied))), the sections do not offend due process.
234. No. 14-08-01171, 2009 WL 4667403, at *3 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Dec.
10, 2009).
235. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.255(a) (West 2011).
236. McCarroll, 2009 WL 4667403, at *3.
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242. Phillips v. United Heritage Corp., 319 S.W.3d 156, 161 (Tex. App.-Waco 2010, no
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poration brought suit in Texas alleging the shares were disposed of in an
untimely manner. 244 During this initial suit, the trial court rendered judg-
ment in favor of the Utah corporation awarding damages, fees, costs, and
interest.2 45
After the Utah corporation unsuccessfully attempted to execute the
judgment, it sought to pierce the corporate veil and succeeded in holding
the foreign corporation's non-shareholder officers liable for the debt.
246
On appeal, the officers made two arguments.247 First, article 8.02(A) of
the Texas Business Corporations Act requires application of the veil-
piercing law of the TCI.248 Second, article 2.21(A) requires an affirma-
tive finding of "actual fraud" to hold officers liable for a corporation's
contractual obligations.2 49
The Waco Court of Appeals first held that under article 8.02(A), TCI's
veil-piercing law applied.250 Under that article, a foreign corporation is
subject to the same duties, restrictions, penalties, and liabilities imposed
on a domestic corporation, but not in the area of "liability, if any, of
shareholders of the foreign corporation for the debts, liabilities, and obli-
gations of the foreign corporation. '251 The Utah corporation argued that
the article did not apply to non-shareholder officers and directors. 252 Un-
persuaded, the court relied on section 1.104 of the Texas Business Organi-
zations Code, the successor of the Business Corporations Act, which
makes clear that "the laws of a foreign corporation's state or place of
incorporation shall apply when determining the liability of a managerial
official ...or a shareholder, for an obligation, debt, or liability of the
corporation. ' 253 Significant to the court was that article 8.02(A) was one
of the source statutes the Legislature relied on in adopting section 1.104,
and the reviser's note indicated that no substantive change was in-
tended.254 Moreover, applying Texas law to non-shareholder officers but
foreign law to shareholder officers seemed "unreasonable, illogical, and
absurd.'2 55 Because the Utah corporation presented no evidence sup-
porting liability under the laws of the Turks and Caicos Islands, the of-
ficers were not liable pursuant to article 8.02(A). 256
The court also agreed with the officers that article 2.21(A) of the Texas
Business Corporations Act precluded individual liability because it re-
244. Id.
245. Id. at 159-60.
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quires actual fraud.2 57 That section defines alter ego liability for "a
holder of shares, an owner .... or a subscriber .. . , or any affiliate
thereof or of the corporation" for a corporation's contractual obligations
upon a finding of actual fraud.258 The court rejected the Utah corpora-
tion's argument that the officers were not shareholders and did not qual-
ify as "affiliates" under the statute, finding that the plain meaning of
"affiliate" under the article encompasses any individual who is affiliated
simply with the corporation itself in some capacity, which included the
officers. 259 The jury's finding of constructive fraud was not sufficient, and
absent actual fraud, the veil-piercing claims failed.2 60
The Dallas Court of Appeals, in Latham v. Burgher, reiterated that the
term "actual fraud" in an alter ego analysis is not the same as the tort of
fraud.261 In that case, after a roofing company failed to properly repair a
roof, the homeowner sent a demand letter seeking the cost to properly
finish the repair. The owner of the roofing company dissolved the com-
pany two months later. The homeowner sued the roofing company and
its owner for breach of contract and violations of the Deceptive Trade
Practices Act, and a jury pierced the corporate veil to hold the roofing
company's owner liable.
To pierce the corporate veil under an alter ego theory, a plaintiff must
show actual fraud.262 At the charge conference, the lawyer for the roof-
ing company's owner submitted a definition of fraud akin to the tort of
fraud. The court of appeals rejected that definition and reiterated its
prior definition from Dick's Last Resort of West End, Inc. v. Market/Ross,
Ltd., which defined "actual fraud" as "dishonesty of purpose or intent to
deceive. ' 263 Because the trial court gave this exact definition to the jury,
it did not abuse its discretion.264 In reviewing whether the evidence was
sufficient to support the jury's finding of actual fraud, the appellate court
emphasized that the "ultimate expression" of the owner's use of the com-
pany was his dissolution after threat of suit.265 The owner argued that the
homeowner should look to the roofing company to be made whole, but
his own actions destroyed that option. In these circumstances, the court
held that a rational juror could conclude that the dissolution represented
dishonesty of purpose or an intent to deceive. 266
The Phillips case is significant in that it is a case of first impression
regarding the application of the laws of a foreign jurisdiction in determin-
ing the potential liability of corporate officers and directors. In addition,
257. Id. at 166.
258. Id. (quoting TEX. Bus. CoRP. Acr ANN. art. 2.21(A) (West 2003)).
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. 320 S.W.3d 602, 607 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, no pet.).
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263. Id. (citing Dick's Last Resort of West End, Inc. v. Market/Ross, Ltd., 273 S.W.3d
905, 908 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, pet. denied)).
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both the Phillips case and the Latham case are helpful for corporate de-
fendants because they clarify that the fraud element necessary to pierce
the corporate veil cannot be satisfied through mere constructive fraud but
must be established through evidence of actual "dishonesty of purpose or
intent to deceive. ' 267 With this clarification, plaintiffs will face a higher
obstacle in getting past the corporate structure to the individuals' assets.
D. WHO DETERMINES "DETERMINED ... IN FACT"?
The Fifth Circuit was tasked with interpreting the D&O liability policy
of R. Allen Stanford and other executives who allegedly participated in a
heavily publicized ponzi scheme. In Pendergest-Holt v. Certain Under-
writers of Lloyd's of London, the Fifth Circuit addressed the difference
between a "final adjudication" and "determined ... in fact" as used in a
D&O policy governed by Texas law.268 The executives faced several
criminal and civil proceedings that implicated coverage under a policy
issued by Lloyd's of London and Arch Specialty Insurance Company with
a $100 million policy limit.269 The policy paid for loss "incurred in de-
fending any judicial or administrative proceeding against a director or
officer. '270 The policy did not "impose a duty to defend, [but] [r]ather,
the executives must defend [the] claims themselves" with the underwrit-
ers responsible for costs submitted before they are incurred.
271
"The underwriters initially agreed to advance defense costs .... but
expressly reserved the right to deny coverage at any time based on the
policy's terms, including exclusions for fraud and money laundering. "272
The money laundering exclusion "bar[red] coverage for loss ... resulting
from any claim 'arising... as a result of or in connection with ... money
laundering.' 273 The policy defined money laundering as, in essence, the
"use or possession of Criminal Property," which was in turn broadly de-
fined as "property obtained from or as a result of . . . criminal con-
duct. 27 4 Despite the stated coverage bar, the policy "provide[d] for
qualified reimbursement of defense costs, coupled with the ability to claw
back reimbursed funds [at] .. .such time that it is determined that the
alleged act or alleged acts did in fact occur. '275
In November 2009, "the underwriters ... advised the executives that
[they] would no longer provide coverage .. .because they had deter-
267. Id.
268. 600 F.3d 562, 573 (5th Cir. 2010).
269. Id. at 566 n.2. There were actually two policies, but the court referred to them as a
single policy.
270. Id. at 566.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 567.
274. Id.
275. Id. (emphasis modified).
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mined" the money laundering exclusion applied.2 76 The executives
quickly filed suit in the Southern District of Texas seeking "a declaration
that their defense costs must be reimbursed ... and a preliminary injunc-
tion ordering the underwriters to pay [such] costs until a final judgment
on the merits of the coverage dispute. '277 The trial court determined the
exclusion would most likely not preclude coverage and granted the pre-
liminary injunction. 278 The underwriters successfully sought a stay pend-
ing an expedited appeal of the preliminary injunction.
The executives argued that there could be no determination of whether
the exclusion applied until a final adjudication of the underlying proceed-
ings.279 The underwriters, on the other hand, interpreted "it is deter-
mined" as giving them the authority to, in essence, unilaterally determine
whether the exclusion applied. 280 The Fifth Circuit disagreed, first ex-
ploring the definitions of "determined" and "in fact," and concluding that
"taken together they favor a judicial decisionmaker over any other."2 81
The court found that if the policy intended the underwriters to make the
determination, it could have said "we have determined" or "Underwriters
determined. '282 The parties chose the phrase "it is determined," likely
because selling a policy with such a "draconian power" as allowing the
underwriters to unilaterally decide would be "difficult to sell."'283
The Fifth Circuit disagreed with the executives as well, finding the
fraud exclusion instructive. 284 That exclusion disclaimed loss for fraud
"as determined by a final adjudication. '285 Thus, the court reasoned "de-
termined" and "in fact" must have some meaning other than "final adju-
dication. '2 86 The court's review of precedent revealed that courts have
consistently held "final adjudication" to require an adjudication in the
underlying D&O proceeding. 287 By contrast, courts have generally inter-
preted "in fact" more broadly than a "final adjudication. 2 88 The Fifth
Circuit ultimately concluded that the coverage decision should be made,
not in the underlying proceedings, but in a parallel and independent pro-
ceeding, though both phrases place the determination of coverage in the
276. Id. at 567-68. The underwriters denied coverage back to August 27, 2009-the
date of one of the executive's guilty plea. In other words, they were seeking to claw back
costs incurred between that date and the November 2009 letter.
277. Id. at 568.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 569-70.
280. It appears that at oral argument both sides backed away from these positions. Id.
at 570. The executives conceded that the "in fact" determination may be heard in a paral-
lel coverage matter. The underwriters conceded that, at the very least, their determination
was judicially reviewable.
281. Id. at 570-71.
282. Id. at 571.
283. Id. (quoting Assoc. Elec. & Gas Ins. Servs. v. Rigas, 382 F. Supp. 2d 685, 701 (E.D.
Pa. 2004)).
284. Id. at 566-67.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 571-72.
287. Id. at 572.
288. Id. at 573.
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first instance in the hands of the judiciary.2 89
This case is very significant for corporate officers and directors because
whether or not the D&O insurer is required to fund or reimburse the
costs of defense can have a dramatic (if not outcome determinative) ef-
fect on the officers' and directors' ability to mount a defense. By requir-
ing a determination by the court, rather than by the insurer, that a
coverage exclusion applies, this opinion provides some protection for the
insured defendant.
VI. CONCLUSION
Texas courts remained busy during the Survey period deciding many
issues affecting professional liabilities. From deciding when an injured
plaintiff is forever barred from complaining about a sponge mistakenly
left in her body to finding no specific jurisdiction over non-resident of-
ficers of foreign corporations doing business in Texas, the Texas Supreme
Court showed its continued interest in professional negligence law. It re-
mains to be seen whether the high court will agree with the many appel-
late court decisions in these areas such as disallowing fracturing of legal
malpractice claims, application of a higher standard of care in cases of
undiagnosed emergency medical conditions, and imposing liability
squarely on officers and directors of defunct corporations. Regardless, it
is clear from this Survey period that the professional negligence land-
scape is constantly changing and requires careful monitoring to stay
abreast of these important topics.
289. Id. at 574-75.
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